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An Ethico-Legal Analysis of Legal Personality and Artificial Intelligence
as Applied to Robotic Carers
¸ Dr John Rumbold, PhD Kingston University London/Barbara Pierscio-
nek, Nottingham Trent University. Further information about the
authors at p. 64.
As artificial intelligence (AI) advances the legal issues
have not progressed in step and principles that exist have
become outdated in a relatively short time. Privacy is a
major concern and the myriad of devices that store data
for wide ranging purposes risk breaches of privacy.
Treating such a breach as a design defect or technical
fault, does not reflect the complexities of legal liability
that apply to robotics. Where advanced levels of AI are
involved, such as with electronic butlers and carers used
increasingly to assist vulnerable and ageing populations,
the question of whether a robot owes a duty of confiden-
tiality to the person for whom they are caring is becom-
ing ever more pertinent. This question is considered in
detail and it is concluded that a duty may be owed in
some cases. After a brief introduction (I.) the article
picks up on the aspects of legal agency and AI (II.) and
examines robots as social beeings (III.), their relation-
ship to duty (IV.) as well as their capacity as “extended
cognition” (V.). These aspects are then brought in con-
text with issues of data protection (VI.) and the general
relationship between civil law, ethics and robotics (VII.)
before conclusions (VIII.) are drawn.
I. Introduction
The law on artificial intelligence (AI) on robotics is
evolving, but as Collingridge’s law predicts, it has failed
to keep up with technological advances1
1 LIEBERT, W. and SCHMIDT, J.C., 2010. Collingridge’s dilemma and
technoscience. Poiesis & Praxis, 7(1–2), pp. 55–71.
. A set of princi-
ples for robotics published just seven years ago is already
out of date (see below in section VII)2
2 EPSRC, 2011-last update, Principles of robotics [Homepage of EPSRC],
[Online]. Available: https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/research/ourportfolio/the
mes/engineering/activities/principlesofrobotics [21st Feb, 2017].
. It fails to take into
account the problems of machine learning, which mean
that programming and subsequent behaviour is not
entirely predictable nor wholly down to human agency.
Privacy is one of the biggest concerns in modern society,
with some commentators expressing the view that pri-
vacy has disappeared altogether3
3 JOHN, N.A. and PETERS, B., 2017. Why privacy keeps dying: the trou-
ble with talk about the end of privacy. Information, Communication &
Society, 20(2), pp. 284–298.
. Recently, consumers
had to be warned about their conversations within “ear-
shot” of their Samsung smart television4
4 RUSHTON, K., 2015, Feb 9th. Samsung warns viewers: Our smart TVs
could be snooping on your private conversations. Daily Mail (Feb 9th).
. The FTC in the
USA fined a television manufacturer, Vizio, for tracking
users’ viewing habits and selling the information5
5 FAIR, L., Feb 6th, 2017-last update, What Vizio was doing behind the
TV screen [Homepage of FTC], [Online]. Available: https://www.ftc.gov
/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/02/what-vizio-was-doing-behi
nd-tv-screen [Mar 21st, 2017].
. These
issues are typically seen as defects of design, with the
manufacturers or operators being responsible for such
breaches rather than the television set or another
device.6
6 See footnote 2.
It is now recognized that legal liability for
advanced robots would not be as straightforward as
this. In many cases, they can be seen as mere agents, but
particularly where advanced levels of AI are involved,
this will not necessarily be the case7
7 PAGALLO, U., 2013. The laws of robots. Springer.
. Electronic butlers
and carers are already a reality8
8 HOWARD, A., 2013. Robots Learn to Play: Robots Emerging Role in
Pediatric Therapy, The Twenty-Sixth International FLAIRS Conference
2013; ISHIGURO, H., ONO, T., IMAI, M., MAEDA, T., KANDA, T.
and NAKATSU, R., 2001. Robovie: an interactive humanoid robot.
Industrial Robot: An International Journal, 28(6), pp. 498–504;
ZDNET, Jan 13th, 2016-last update, At your service: 8 personal assis-
tant robots coming home soon [Homepage of ZDNet], [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/at-your-service-8-personal-assist
ant-robots-coming-home-soon/6 [Mar 21st, 2017].
, and the ageing popula-
tion and the increasing need for care might lead to the
provision of electronic care assistants in the home. Will
these electronic aides owe a duty of privacy to the per-
sons for whom they are caring? It is our argument that
the answer is not ‘No’ in all cases.
II. Legal Agency and AI
The answer will probably depend on both the level of AI
and the capacity that the dependent has. The dependent
may potentially form an emotional bond with a suffi-
ciently advanced robot, which poses some ethical ques-
tions of its own. It is known that play robots can engage
children for hours9
9 Ibid.
, but will this decrease the amount of
time parents spend with their children? Where the alter-
native is passively watching TV, the play robot might be
preferable. Are robotic pets for the elderly ethical, par-
ticularly if they get emotionally attached to the animal
substitute? If a person with dementia believes that the
robotic pet is a real pet, is this a process of infantilisation
and hence an offence to the dignity of that person?10
10 SHARKEY, A. and SHARKEY, N., 2012. Granny and the robots: ethical
issues in robot care for the elderly. Ethics and Information Technology,
14(1), pp. 27–40.
III. Robots as Social Beings
Humanoid robots are often anthropomorphised. There
was an emotional reaction when the hitchhiking robot
HitchBot was destroyed in the USA11
11 GRIGGS, M.B., Aug 3rd, 2015-last update, Friendly Hitchhiking Robot
Is Vandalized, Destroyed In America This is why we can’t have nice
things [Homepage of Popular Science], [Online]. Available: http://
www.popsci.com/friendly-hitchhiking-robot-vandalized-destroyed-am
erica [Feb 21st, 2017].
. Speculative fiction
is replete with examples of robots becoming humanised,
from Terminator to Blade Runner/Do Androids Dream
of Electric Sheep? to Almost Human.
1. Unease with Humanoids
Where the robot is humanoid, there may be an issue with
the “uncanny valley”. This phenomenon describes the
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human reaction of revulsion to a robot or other simula-
crum of humanity that is close but close enough to the
real thing12
12 MORI, M., MACDORMAN, K.F. and KAGEKI, N., 2012. The
uncanny valley [from the field]. IEEE Robotics & Automation Maga-
zine, 19(2), pp. 98–100.
. The form of a baby harp seal was chosen for
Paro to minimise these effects, as people are less familiar
with “sealness” than say “catness”13
13 VAN DER LOOS, HF MACHIEL, 2007. Ethics by design: A conceptual
approach to personal and service robot systems, ICRA Roboethics
Workshop, Rome, Italy: IEEE 2007, Citeseer.
. One important
question is whether a humanoid robot might have a dis-
turbing effect on clients with mental health issues or sen-
sory impairments. It has been suggested there may be a
“uncanny valley of mind”, where the appearance of
emotional capacities in a robot may cause unease14
14 STEIN, J. and OHLER, P., 2017. Venturing into the uncanny valley of
mind – The influence of mind attribution on the acceptance of human-
like characters in a virtual reality setting. Cognition, 160, pp. 43–50.
.
2. Emotional Attachment
The relevance of these issues is that our attitudes to
robots are influenced by their appearance15
15 DARLING, K., 2016. Extending legal protection to social robots: The
effects of anthropomorphism, empathy, and violent behavior towards
robotics objects. In: R. CALO, A.M. FROOMKIN and I. KERR, eds,
Robot Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 213–218.
. Calo com-
ments on our tendency to react to robots as social beings,
and cites a reported example of soldiers risking their
lives to rescue a robotic member of the team16
16 CALO, R., 2015. Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw. California Law
Review, 103, pp. 513.
. Darling
reports that soldiers name their robots, promote them,
and become upset when they “die”17
17 See footnote 15.
. Whether or not
human beings can have a friendship with robots is deba-
ted18
18 DANAHER, J., Feb 18th, 2017 – last update, Can you be friends with a
robot? Aristotelian Friendship and Robotics. Available: http://philosop
hicaldisquisitions.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/can-you-be-friends-with-ro
bot.html [Mar 13th, 2017].
. The human can have an emotional attachment to
the robot, but not vice versa. If it is difficult for a human
to understand what it is like to be a bat19
19 NAGEL, T., 1974. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review,
83(4), pp. 435–450.
, it will be even
more difficult for a robot to understand what it is like to
be a human. It could be argued that the robot, whether a
T-800 killer robot (Terminator franchise)20
20 Terminator franchise. Orion Pictures, 1984–2015.
or a Paro
baby harp seal, has no capacity for moral agency or an
emotional attachment to the human being21
21 BRINGSJORD, S., 2008. Ethical robots: the future can heed us. AI &
Society, 22(4), pp. 539–550.
; this means
that robots cannot have empathy (a trait exploited in the
Voigt-Kampff empathy test in Do Androids Dream of
Electric Sheep?/Blade Runner)22
22 DICK, P.K., 1968. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Doubleday.
. There is also an argu-
ment that in the future robots can become moral
agents23
23 DENNETT, D.C., 2014. When HAL kills, who’s to blame?: computer
ethics. Rethinking responsibility in science and technology, pp. 203–
214.
. The genuine personality (called “Synthetic
Soul”) demonstrated by “Dorian”, the DRN Police Syn-
thetic in “Almost Human”24
24 Almost Human. Fox TV, aired 2013-14.
, is not a possibility on the
immediate horizon.
3. Trust
The maintenance of a relationship requires trust. The
robot in Robot & Frank agrees not to tell Frank’s son
about their activities to build trust25
25 Robot & Frank. Stage 6 Films, released 2012.
. In the film, a retired
burglar enlists his robotic carer into one last robbery. In
its own way, the robot provides Frank with indepen-
dence. Frank becomes attached to the robot and wants
to prevent its memory being erased. A requirement for
robots to be slavishly adherent to the law will inhibit
their capacity to be social beings. It also inhibits their
capacity to drive, for example – another activity that
relies on social cues and interactions26
26 NAUGHTON, K., Dec 18th, 2015-last update, Humans Are Slamming
Into Driverless Cars and Exposing a Key Flaw [Homepage of Bloom-
berg], [Online]. Available: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2
015-12-18/humans-are-slamming-into-driverless-cars-and-exposing-a
-key-flaw [Mar 14th, 2017].
.
IV. Robots and Duty
Where the robot is an assistive technology and the
dependent has an expectation of privacy, there may be a
legal case for respecting that on the ground of the com-
mon law duty of confidentiality (with some exceptions
where personal safety is involved, just as with human
agents). Whether the appropriate test should be objec-
tive or subjective is arguable. It would require advanced
capabilities for a robot to recognize subjective expecta-
tions. These issues are not theoretical. Toys connected to
the internet can be hacked27
27 GIBBS, S., 2015. Toy firm VTech hack exposes private data of parents
and children.
, and recently the doll
“Cayla” was banned in Germany as a “hidden espio-
nage device”28
28 PHYS ORG, Feb 18th, 2017-last update, Germany bans internet-con-
nected ‘spying’ doll Cayla [Homepage of Phys Org], [Online]. Available:
https://phys.org/news/2017-02-germany-internet-connected-spying-do
ll-cayla.html [Mar 26th, 2017].
. In a recent case in Arkansas, police have
applied for a warrant for voice data from an Amazon
Echo device used by a murder suspect29
29 ORTIZ, E., Dec 28th, 2016-last update, Prosecutors Get Warrant for
Amazon Echo Data in Arkansas Murder Case [Homepage of NBC
News], [Online]. Available: http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/pro
secutors-get-warrant-amazon-echo-data-arkansas-murder-case-n7007
76 [Feb 21st, 2017].
. There are many
apps being developed for mental health care. These
forms of AI might become effective electronic confes-
sors, with all the responsibilities and duties that this
entails. One study found that 57% of children would
trust ‘Robovie” with their secrets30
30 KAHN JR, P.H., KANDA, T., ISHIGURO, H., FREIER, N.G., SEVER-
SON, R.L., GILL, B.T., RUCKERT, J.H. and SHEN, S., 2012. “Robo-
vie, you’ll have to go into the closet now”: Children’s social and moral
relationships with a humanoid robot. Developmental Psychology, 48(2),
pp. 303.
. Conversely, for
someone who is very self-conscious about their body,
having care performed by a non-judgmental robot may
be preferable to exposing themselves to human gaze.
1. Legal Agency of Robot/AI
The robot/AI can be considered capable of legal agency
itself, or alternatively the dependent is capable of
instructing the robot as his or her agent. Even if the robot
is provided by the carers, it can be argued (if the robot is
afforded some form of legal agency) that the robot in
fact owes its “duty of care” to the dependent. This is the
position that Frank’s robot takes, within limits. Its prior-
ity is to optimise Frank’s health, even if this includes
planning and executing crimes.
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2. Implications of “Duty of Care”
“Duty of care” has moral connotations which arguably
would not apply to a robot without moral agency. Can a
robot have any duties in that sense? When the cleaning
mechanoid Kryten in the science fiction TV series Red
Dwarf31
31 Red Dwarf. Grant Naylor/Baby Cow, 1992.
is exhibiting relish for his cleaning duties, can
that be attributed to any morally praiseworthy qualities
or is it simply an inevitable result of his programming?
We praise a dog as a “good boy” when he has been
trained well. By analogy, we might consider a robot that
has developed good traits for social care through
machine learning a “good robot”.
3. Implications of Accountability
One of the issues surrounding robots in many applica-
tions is accountability. Accountability ultimately relies
on the potential for punishment for infringements. Can a
robot be truly punished? If a robot is damaged or even
destroyed, does it suffer? Punishment and suffering
requires an emotional capacity that is neither necessary
nor desirable for a manufactured entity. Any aberrant
behaviour only requires correction, not retribution.
Some might argue there needs to be human supervision,
whether the robot is a battlefield robot who kills or a
carer who tends; the moral agent for whom, in the
phrase popularised by Harry S Truman, “the buck stops
here”32
32 HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, “The Buck Stops
Here” Desk Sign. Available: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.
htm [Mar 15th, 2017].
. Other commentators warn about the unneces-
sary insertion of a human in the loop as a “moral crum-
ple zone” – a cyber scape-goat33
33 ELISH, M., 2016. Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-
Robot Interaction (We Robot 2016).
.
4. Definition of “Duty”
Duty can also be defined as
“A task or action that one is require to perform as part of
one’s job”34
34 OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, Definition of duty [Homepage of
Oxford Living Dictionaries], [Online]. Available: https://en.oxforddicti
onaries.com/definition/duty [Mar 15th, 2017].
If we therefore re-frame “duty” as a responsibility that is
part of the robot’s role, then the robot certainly can have
a “duty of care” and a “duty of confidentiality. If there is
a duty of care, then it is reasonable in light of the nature
of the care to presume a duty of confidentiality too.
Frank’s robot wants to fulfil this duty of confidentiality
by having its memory erased.
V. ICT and Our Brains – Aid or Extension?
ICT is so intertwined with our thought processes that the
term “extended cognition” has been coined to describe
the use of computers and other devices as an extension of
our minds. It has been suggested that therefore compro-
mising these functional extensions of our brains could be
considered an assault35
35 CARTER, J.A. and PALERMOS, S.O., 2016. Is having your computer
compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition. Jour-
nal of the American Philosophical Association.
. It has been argued that a war-
rant should be required in the UK before police can
search mobile phones (it is already required in the USA
as per Riley v. California)36
36 Riley v. California 134 Supreme Court of the United States 2473 (2014).
. If the extended cognition
metaphor is accepted, such searches without a warrant
could be seen as contravening the right against self-
incrimination. The alternative argument is that the
devices are used simply for cognitive offloading in the
same way as a paper diary or address book. The ratio
decidendi of Riley was that searching the phone involved
a much greater intrusion of privacy than the limited
search of the immediate surrounding covered under the
warrantless search exception. The phone contained far
more data than a diary or address book would.
Where these assistive technologies are employed to help
the vulnerable, the issue of privacy is even more compel-
ling. Here the technology is being used as part of the
management of their condition, rather than an option
chosen by a competent adult to make life easier. The
extended cognition supplements a compromised cogni-
tion in a form of bio-enhancement. When someone with
dementia records something as an aide memoire, this is
externalising a thought that would normally be safe on
the inside of one’s own head. It seems proportionate
therefore to protect that information more robustly than
for the general population. These situations would test
the limits of the objective definition of “reasonable
expectation of privacy”.
VI. Data protection issues
These issues can be examined through the prism of data
protection law. There is no doubt that these data are per-
sonal. Where the robot is providing care, very often they
will be sensitive data triggering a much stricter regula-
tory regime like e.g. under Art. 9 (EU) General Data Pro-
tection Regulation. The storage and retention of data
might be essential for the functioning of the technology,
provision of care, and audit and accountability purposes
– in which case consent would not be necessary. None-
theless, it would be important to make the client aware
of this, especially where they have capacity.
1. Capacity to Consent
Where data is collected as part of giving care and only
used for that purpose and related uses (such as audit),
then consent is not required. Data sharing for technol-
ogy development does not come under this categorisati-
on37
37 DONNELLY, C., May 12th, 2016-last update, ICO probes Google
DeepMind patient data-sharing deal with NHS Hospital Trust [Home-
page of ComputerWeekly.com], [Online]. Available: http://www.compu
terweekly.com/news/450296175/ICO-probes-Google-DeepMind-pati
ent-data-sharing-deal-with-NHS-Hospital-Trust.
. If the technology (whether robot or app) requires
you to waive your right to privacy, the person with men-
tal health issues might feel that their needs outweigh the
disadvantages. In other circumstances this consent
would be perfectly valid, but where the vulnerable are
concerned there should be additional protections
beyond requirement for consent, even where this is
explicit and informed consent. The vulnerable may lack
the capacity for truly informed consent, but nonetheless
may benefit from assistive technologies that require data
retention and sharing. For these reasons, privacy by
design is preferable to models based on autonomy and
consent. A capacity for the client to delete the robot’s
memory would be useful in some circumstances.
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2. Legitimate Data Access
The fact that data storage and retention are necessary for
the provision of care does not mean that their use will be
unrestricted. Any secondary use requires the usual safe-
guard afforded under data protection law. It may well be
appropriate to use data for developing assistive technol-
ogy further even without explicit consent, to avoid
obstructing the progress of useful technology for this
group.
VII. Civil Law, Ethics, and Robotics
1. European Union
The European Parliament has been debating civil laws
on robotics38
38 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2017. P8_TA-PROV(2017)0051 Civil
Law Rules on Robotics European Parliament resolution of 16 February
2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on
Robotics (2015/2103(INL)). Brussels: European Union.
. They examined the shortcomings of the
law as it stands and concluded:
“the current legal framework would not be sufficient to
cover the damage caused by the new generation of
robots, insofar as they can be equipped with adaptive
and learning abilities entailing a certain degree of unpre-
dictability in their behaviour, since those robots would
autonomously learn from their own variable experience
and interact with their environment in a unique and
unforeseeable manner.” [para AI]
The resolution also comments on the issue of emotional
attachment to robots:
“special attention should be paid to the possible devel-
opment of an emotional connection between humans
and robots – particularly in vulnerable groups (children,
the elderly and people with disabilities) – and highlights
the issues raised by the serious emotional or physical
impact that this emotional attachment could have on
humans.” [General principles, para 3]
2. UK
The EPSRC and AHRC jointly issued principles of
robotics in 2011. The five chief principles were:
1. “Robots are multiuse tools. Robots should not be
designed solely or primarily to kill or harm humans,
except in the interests of national security.
2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots
should be designed; operated as far as is practicable
to comply with existing laws & fundamental
rights & freedoms, including privacy.
3. Robots are products. They should be designed using
processes which assure their safety and security.
4. Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not
be designed in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable
users; instead their machine nature should be trans-
parent.
5. The person with legal responsibility for a robot
should be attributed.”39
39 See footnote 2.
The denial of robotic agency would rule out an elec-
tronic butler owing a duty of confidentiality, but privacy
by design would be expected.
3. USA
There is substantial case law in the USA on robots.40
40 See footnote 16.
Sev-
eral jurists have analysed the issues posed by robots and
Calo has proposed a Federal Robotics Commission.
(COMM 2014)
Arkin has published work on an ethical governor, which
has greater promise in the context of social robots than a
prescribed set of laws41
41 ARKIN, R.C., SCHEUTZ, M. and TICKLE-DEGNEN, L., 2014. Pre-
serving dignity in patient caregiver relationships using moral emotions
and robots, Proceedings of the IEEE 2014 International Symposium on
Ethics in Engineering, Science, and Technology 2014, IEEE Press, pp. 5;
ARKIN, R.C., ULAM, P. and DUNCAN, B., 2009. DTIC Document.
. It has only been developed for a
limited set of circumstances, but promises a level of
sophistication far greater than a purely rules-based
approach. The robot would apply a form of moral calcu-
lus, rather than apply a set of hierarchical rules such as
Asimov’s laws of robotics. The results of this robotic
moral reasoning would require monitoring (much like
human moral reasoning).
4. Japan
The Japanese have been the most enthusiastic adopters
of robotics42
42 KELLY, W., 1989. Monumenta Nipponica, 44(1), pp. 133–135.
. They have a Robotics Policy Office. One
set of principles (adapted from Osamu Tezuka’s princi-
ples for Astro Boy43
43 WIKIPEDIA, Mar 25th, 2017-last update, Astro Boy [Homepage of
Wikipedia], [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astro_B
oy [Mar 27th, 2017].
) states:
1. Robots must serve mankind
2. Robots must never kill or injure humans
3. Robot manufacturers shall be responsible for their
creations
4. Robots involved in the production of currency, con-
traband or dangerous goods, must hold a current per-
mit
5. Robots shall not leave the country without a permit
6. A robot’s identity must not be altered, concealed or
allowed to be misconstrued
7. Robots shall remain identifiable at all times
8. Robots created for adult purposes shall not be per-
mitted to work with children
9. Robots must not assist in criminal activities, nor aid
or abet criminals to escape justice
10. Robots must refrain from damaging human homes
or tools, including other robots44
44 SCHODT, F.L., 1988. Inside the robot kingdom. Kodansha.
Some of these ten principles have little ethical import e.g.
principle 5. Principle 9 would rule out the type of assis-
tance rendered in Robot & Frank. It would require an
electronic butler to betray certain confidences, particu-
larly relating to criminal activity.
5. Other initiatives
Murphy and Woods proposed the “Three Laws of
Responsible Robotics”:
1) “A human may not deploy a robot without the
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human-robot work system meeting the highest legal
and professional standards of safety and ethics.
2) A robot must respond to humans as appropriate for
their roles.
3) A robot must be endowed with sufficient situated
autonomy to protect its own existence as long as such
protection provides smooth transfer of control
which does not conflict with the First and Second
Laws.”45
45 MURPHY, R. and WOODS, D.D., 2009. Beyond Asimov: the three
laws of responsible robotics. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 24(4).
These three laws might be consistent with an electronic
butler respecting a duty of confidentiality, depending on
the precise determination of relevant standards of ethics.
Russian entrepreneur, Dmitry Grishin, has retained law-
yers to develop what is claimed will be the world’s first
laws on robotics (although the current schedule in Rus-
sia is for enactment by 2022)46
46 KARAVAEVA, O., Dec 19th, 2016-last update, Lawyers and science fic-
tion: Dentons develops first robotics draft law in Russia [Homepage of
Dentons], [Online]. Available: http://www.dentons.com/en/whats-diffe
rent-about-dentons/connecting-you-to-talented-lawyers-around-the-gl
obe/news/2016/december/dentons-develops-russias-first-ever-robotics
-draft-law [Mar 15th, 2017].
. The development of a
South Korean robotic ethics charter was announced in
2007, but there has been no official publication as yet.
The Open Roboethics initiative (ORi) proposes an inter-
net-based resource for roboethics47
47 MOON, A.J., CALISGAN, E., BASSANI, C., FERREIRA, F., OPERTO,
F., VERUGGIO, G., CROFT, E.A. and VD LOOS, H.F.M., 2016. The
Open Roboethics initiative and the elevator-riding robot. In: R. CALO,
A.M. FROOMKIN and I. KERR, eds, Robot Law. Cheltenham: Elgar,
pp. 131–162.
.
There are clear differences in the sophistication of
approach between these deliberations, reflecting the
expectations of robots at the time of their formulation.
The European deliberations acknowledge the potential
for unpredictable behaviour patterns due to the process
of machine learning. The other principles contain no ref-
erence to robots being anything but tools and slaves to
their human creators, except for the laws of Murphy and
Wood, which are not specific.
VIII. Conclusions
In summary, our argument is that there is a “duty of
care” and thus a “duty of confidentiality” that arises
with the development of legal agency in sufficiently
advanced robots. There are also expectations generated
by anthropomorphism with sufficiently realistic robots.
Even where this is not the case, there is a privacy argu-
ment for the protection of personal data. Conceptual
arguments about the status of assistive technologies may
reinforce the arguments for the privacy of vulnerable
persons. However, assistive technologies are likely to be
dependent on a high degree of data sharing. Robust gov-
ernance mechanisms and legal protections are preferable
to a reliance on consent, given that many of those cared
for lack full capacity. Mechanisms for moral reasoning
such as the ethical governor promise greater flexibility
than a rules-based approach.
CJEU: Sale of Computer with Pre-Installed Software
No Unfair Commercial Practice
Directive 2005/29/EC Art. 5, 7
Headnotes
1. A commercial practice consisting of the sale of a
computer equipped with pre-installed software with-
out any option for the consumer to purchase the same
model of computer not equipped with pre-installed
software does not in itself constitute an unfair com-
mercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(2) of
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the
internal market and amending Council Directive 84/
450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/
65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European
Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive’), unless such a practice is con-
trary to the requirements of professional diligence
and materially distorts or is likely to materially dis-
tort the economic behaviour of the average consumer
with regard to the product, a matter which is for the
national court to determine by taking account of the
specific circumstances of the case in the main pro-
ceedings.
2. In the context of a combined offer consisting of the
sale of a computer equipped with pre-installed soft-
ware, the failure to indicate the price of each of those
items of pre-installed software does not constitute a
misleading commercial practice within the meaning
of Article 5(4)(a) and Article 7 of Directive 2005/29.
CJEU, decision of 7 September 2016 in case C-310/15 by
Sˇva´by, President of the Chamber, Malenovsky´ and Saf-
jan, Judges
Vincent Deroo-Blanquart v. Sony Europe Ltd
Facts
1This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation
of Articles 5 and 7 of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal mar-
ket and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/
7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and
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